Employment Research Newsletter
Volume 29

Number 2

Article 3

5-11-2022

Employment Research, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 2022

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research

Citation
W.E. Upjohn Institute. 2022. Employment Research. 29(2). https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.29(2)

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

APRIL 2022 • VOL 29, NO 2

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Recent research has
suggested that labor markets
may not be fully competitive,
meaning workers are paid less
than the value they add.
n We develop a new approach
to measuring and estimating
“markdowns”—the gaps
between wages and the value
a worker adds—in the U.S.
manufacturing sector.
n Drawing on confidential
survey data on U.S.
manufacturers, we find
that the typical worker at
the average manufacturing
plant earns 65 cents on each
marginal dollar generated.
n The degree of monopsony
varies greatly across and
within manufacturing
industries, with markdowns
generally higher for larger and
more productive plants.
n For U.S. manufacturing
as a whole, markdowns
shrank between 1980 and
2000 but have risen sharply
more recently, suggesting
manufacturing workers are
increasingly underpaid relative
to their value.
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Monopsony in Manufacturing
Chen Yeh, Claudia Macaluso, and Brad Hershbein
Most textbook economic models assume
that labor markets are perfectly competitive. In
such a case, workers’ pay equals the marginal
contributions to their employers’ revenues, or what
economists call marginal revenue product of labor
(MRPL). For example, a worker who generates $20
more in employer revenues per hour should be
compensated $20 per hour. If an employer paid this
worker less than that, the theory says the worker
could simply switch to another employer who is
willing to pay slightly more and still make a profit.
However, many researchers and policymakers
have recently grown concerned that the textbook
model is not accurate and that employers’ market
power over workers has increased. This power
could arise from ways in which employers may
restrict their workers from looking for other job
opportunities, such as noncompete agreements
(Starr, Prescott, and Bishara 2021), a growing
reluctance for workers to change locations (Molloy,
Smith, and Wozniak 2014), or business mergers
that result in fewer employers competing for
workers (Prager and Schmitt 2021). However, it has
been remarkably challenging for researchers to find
direct and general evidence on labor market power,
and this has complicated the policy debate. The
reason for this lack of evidence is simple: While
wages are observable in some data sets, firms’
MRPLs are hard to measure. Without the latter, it
is almost impossible to determine whether MRPLs
are equal to wages, as is predicted by perfect
competition.
In a recent paper, we develop a new technique
to show that employer market power is substantial
and widespread in the U.S. manufacturing
sector. Using this approach, we find that over
the past several decades, a worker in the average
manufacturing plant receives only 65 cents on
each dollar generated on the margin. Furthermore,
we construct a novel aggregate measure for labor
market power, across all manufacturing plants and
workers in the United States, to understand how
this phenomenon has evolved over time. We find

that employers’ market power actually decreased
between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, but that
it sharply increased in the decade or so afterward.
Our study thus provides direct evidence that
many workers are paid less than their “fair share,”

An employer with labor market
power compensates its workers
with wage rates below the
marginal revenue they add.
complementing earlier studies (as reviewed in
Sokolova and Sorensen 2020) which often relied on
indirect methods. Despite recent gains in worker
wages since the pandemic, employer market power
likely remains considerable.
Measuring Employers’ Labor Market Power
Under a perfectly competitive labor market,
marginal gains in employer revenues generated by
workers should go fully to workers. The intuition
for this is straightforward: Employers that don’t
do this would see many or most of their workers
depart to competitors.
The presence of labor market power, on the other
hand, implies that employers can withhold some of
these marginal gains. Hence, an employer with labor
market power compensates its workers with wage
rates below their MRPLs. Typically, economists have
expressed labor market power through the gap (or
ratio) between a firm’s MRPL and the wages paid to
workers, also known as the markdown.
The main problem with measuring markdowns
is that their components are often not directly
observable. MRPLs are never reported (and are,
indeed, hard to measure), and even hourly wages
are not always available, even in firm-level data.
However, we show that by making some relatively
weak assumptions about a firm’s production
function—how it combines labor, capital, and
other inputs to make products—we can estimate
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plant-level markdowns. To do so, one
requires a few additional pieces of
information. The first is the revenue
share of each input (that is, the
effective spending on that input as

Labor market power is substantial
for U.S. manufacturing plants: on
average, workers collect only 65
cents of every dollar they generate
on the margin for their employers.
a share of a plant’s revenues). Many
firm-level data sets have revenue
share of inputs readily available,
including the confidential Censuses
of Manufacturing and Surveys of
Manufacturing we use for our analysis.
The second component needed

is a measure of a plant’s “output
elasticities”—the percentage increase in
physical output when a particular input
increases by 1 percent. Because these
quantities are not available, we estimate
them using the rest of the data and a
flexible form for a plant’s production
function, adapted from studies of
industrial organization.
This “production function”
approach also allows us to distinguish
labor market power from product
market power. In other words, a firm
or plant could both pay workers below
their MRPL (a wage markdown) and
charge a price for its output product
above the competitive rate (a product
markup). Our approach allows us to
isolate wage markdowns from product
markups, an advantage over some
other methods used to estimate labor
market power. Moreover, it allows us

Table 1 Estimated Plant-Level Markdowns in U.S. Manufacturing
Industry
Petroleum refining
Computers and electronics
Plastics and rubber
Food and kindred products
Paper and allied products
Chemicals
Lumber
Primary metals
Motor vehicles
Printing and publishing
Electrical machinery
Fabricated metals
Nonelectrical machinery
Miscellaneous manufacturing
Textiles
Furniture
Nonmetallic minerals
Apparel and leather
All manufacturing

Median

Mean

Typical range

0.42
0.44
0.55
0.57
0.59
0.62
0.65
0.69
0.73
0.74
0.76
0.80
0.80
0.83
0.83
0.87
0.88
0.97
0.73

0.39
0.39
0.52
0.52
0.56
0.55
0.62
0.67
0.70
0.67
0.71
0.76
0.76
0.80
0.79
0.86
0.82
0.87
0.65

0.26–0.78
0.28–0.67
0.40–0.76
0.37–0.92
0.41– 0.85
0.37–1.06
0.47–0.91
0.50–0.98
0.54–1.01
0.47–1.16
0.52–1.11
0.60–1.05
0.56–1.16
0.62–1.12
0.58–1.23
0.66–1.24
0.58–1.44
0.59–1.65
0.45–1.22

NOTE: The numbers shown represent the fraction of a dollar of revenue generated by workers that is paid in wages
at the median plant, the average plant, and in a range of plants within one standard deviation of the mean, all for
different manufacturing industries. If workers are paid their full value added, the value should be 1.00. Values below
1.00 thus represent wage markdowns. Values can be above 1.00 if workers are paid above their revenue value added.
The sample size underlying the estimates is approximately 1.4 million plant-year observations. The industries shown
approximately follow 3-digit NAICS categories. See the full paper for details of the estimation strategy.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Annual Surveys of Manufacturing and Censuses of Manufacturing, 1976–2014.
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to characterize labor market power
for each plant (or firm) in the U.S.
manufacturing sector.
Labor Market Power in the U.S.
Manufacturing Sector
The key takeaway from our main
results, summarized in the table
below, is that labor market power is
substantial for U.S. manufacturing
plants. At the average plant, workers
collect only 65 cents of every dollar
they generate on the margin for their
employers. Because the distribution is
skewed, the markdown at the median
plant is not quite as severe, but it still
implies that half of plants pay their
workers below 73 cents on the dollar.
Labor market power is extensive
across manufacturing industries,
with the mean (and median) plant
paying wages less than MRPL in each
industry. However, these markdowns
vary considerably across industries;
they are greatest for plants in the
petroleum refining and the computer
and electronics industries, and they
are smallest in the apparel and leather
industry. Furthermore, markdowns
also vary greatly within each industry,
as evidenced by the last column,
which shows the middle range across
plants. While it is certainly plausible
that industry-level factors (such
as unionization rates) can explain
variation in markdowns, our results
indicate that factors specific to
individual plants can be important.1
Aggregate Trends in Labor
Market Power
The markdowns described above
apply at the plant level over our whole
sample period of 1976 through 2014.
As mentioned earlier, however, some
policymakers and academics have
suggested that labor market power
has increased over time for the whole
economy. Despite our markdown
estimates by plant and year, it is not
obvious how to combine these plantlevel measures to obtain a statistic that
reflects the aggregate economy—a
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Figure 1 Aggregate Markdowns and Local Employment Concentration

1.15
Markdown/concentration (normalized)

simple (or even weighted) average
doesn’t quite work.
To calculate aggregate markdown,
we note that plant-level markdowns
are a function of output elasticities
and revenue shares. When we apply
a similar logic to the aggregate
markdown, we can derive a specific
equation that properly weights the
plant-level markdowns, accounting for
their differences in output elasticities,
revenue shares, and total revenues. This
equation for the aggregate markdown
is flexible, in that it does not depend
on how plants are assumed to combine
inputs to make a product, nor on any
particular mechanism for employer
market power.
Applying this method, Figure 1
shows how the aggregate markdown
for the U.S. manufacturing sector has
evolved over time. (We normalize
the aggregate markdown in the first
year, 1977, at a value of 1.00, with
larger values intuitively representing
increases in employer market power.)
After moderately declining in the
late twentieth century, the aggregate
markdown reversed course, and
employer market power sharply
increased in the new millennium.
Because of the difficulties of directly
measuring markdowns, previous
studies have drawn conclusions on
employers’ market power based on
the concentration of employment
across firms. Concentrated labor
markets—those with only a few firms—
naturally limit alternative employment
options for workers, which could
lead to employers exercising their
labor market power. Although this
argument is attractive, employer
concentration does not necessarily lead
to a wage markdown. Indeed, we find
that markdowns and concentration
at the labor market level are only
weakly correlated, and that their time
paths at the national, aggregate level
also diverge, especially recently (as
illustrated by the blue line in Figure 1).
Consequently, it is important to obtain
independent estimates of markdowns
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Aggregate markdown
1.10
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NOTE: The red line plots our measure of the aggregate markdown, normalized to have a value of 1.00 in 1977. The
blue line plots an aggregate of local labor market concentration, also normalized to have a value of 1.00 in 1977.
Details of the construction of both measures are in the full paper (Yeh, Macaluso, and Hershbein 2022).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using Censuses of Manufacturing, 1977–2012.

to draw meaningful conclusions about
labor market power.
Conclusion
Our recent research shows that labor
market power is pervasive in the U.S.
manufacturing sector. Workers are not
fully compensated for their marginal
contributions to their employers’ revenues. Instead, a worker at the average
U.S. manufacturing plant receives only
65 cents for every dollar of revenue
generated on the margin. While labor
market power is widespread, there is
tremendous variation at plants both
across and within industries.
Moreover, our aggregate measure of
markdowns for the U.S. manufacturing
sector as a whole indicates that
employers’ market power has switched
course over time, falling between the
late 1970s and early 2000s but then
sharply rising over the next decade or
so. This suggests that rising employer
market power is unlikely to be the

driver behind the declining share of
total income going to labor, which
started its downward trend decades
earlier.
Note: The views expressed herein are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or
the Federal Reserve System.

Note
1. In the full paper (Yeh, Macaluso,
and Hershbein 2022), we examine
relationships between the magnitude
of markdowns and plants’ age, size,
and productivity. While plant age and
productivity do not appear to be strongly
related to the size of the markdown, plant
size does. In particular, the larger the
plant in terms of its share of employment
in the local labor market (defined by
county and industry), the higher the
markdown. Intuitively, this should make
sense: workers’ outside options are more
limited whenever the local labor market
is controlled by only a handful of plants.
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How Federal Pandemic
Relief Helped Replenish
State Unemployment
Reserves
Christopher J. O’Leary and Kenneth J. Kline
Unemployment insurance (UI)
pays temporary partial earnings
replacement to involuntarily
unemployed workers while they seek
reemployment. Starting in March
2020, as states implemented economic
shutdowns to stop the spread of the
novel coronavirus (COVID-19), UI
became a prime mechanism for income
replacement for the many workers
laid off during this time. However, the
claims for UI were unprecedented in
scope—35.4 million initial applications
for state regular benefits were filed
in the second quarter of 2020, more
than four times the previous peak
quarter, in early 2009. Consequently,
many states ran out of UI reserves and
had to borrow from the U.S. Treasury
to pay benefits. After passage of the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act in March 2020
and the American Rescue Plan (ARP)

Act in March 2021, several states chose
to use some of these federal relief funds
to buttress their reserves. We argue this
choice improved states’ UI reserves
and likely kept states from cutting UI
benefits.
How States Normally Finance Their
UI Programs
Regular state UI programs can
quickly replace at least some income
for unemployed workers. States
establish weekly benefit amounts,
the potential duration of benefits,
and tax systems for financing these
regular benefits. From the 1950s
until after the 2008–2009 financial
crisis, all states paid up to 26 weeks
of regular UI benefits and usually
replaced about 50 percent of prior
earnings, up to state maximum weekly
benefit amounts. State UI benefits are
mainly financed by taxes on employer

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Unemployment insurance (UI) claims reached all-time records during the COVID
pandemic, with 35.4 million applications in the second quarter of 2020 alone.
n Despite federal incentives following the Great Recession for states to shore up their
UI reserves to pay benefits, state balances were inadequate to cover the unprecedented
pandemic surge.
n The federal government paid 80 percent of the total $937 billion in UI benefit
spending in 2020 and 2021.
Chen Yeh and Claudia Macaluso are economists
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, and
Brad Hershbein is a senior economist and deputy
director of research at the Upjohn Institute.
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n Consequently, many states used special federal funds to add to their own UI
reserves or borrowed from the U.S. Treasury to avoid negative balances.
n Although the federal government backstopped the UI system, its actions may delay
states from fixing structural financing issues that will remain a problem.
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payrolls, with employers with more
UI beneficiaries paying higher rates (a
mechanism called experience rating).
States are incentivized to “forward
fund” benefits by building sufficient
reserves, which are held in accounts
with the Unemployment Trust Fund
at the U.S. Treasury. Forward funding
is part of what makes state UI systems
countercyclical—they provide income
to unemployed workers to counter
economic downturns, but they also
dampen expansions during recoveries
through business tax increases to
rebuild reserves. However, deep
downturns can upset this balance.
Benefits paid during and after the
financial crisis exhausted UI reserves in
36 states, forcing them to borrow from
the U.S. Treasury to continue benefit
payments.
To incentivize states to build
larger reserves for the future, the U.S.
Department of Labor in 2014 made
available zero-interest short-term
loans, with a goal of states having
reserves equal to at least one year of
recession-level benefits by 2019. This
threshold, called the average high-cost
multiple (AHCM), was thus set at a
minimum of 1.0, for one year’s worth of
benefits.1 In 2007, before the financial
crisis, only 19 states had reached the
1.0 standard; the average AHCM
across states was 0.52. Following the
financial crisis, the UI debt problem led
to a range of state responses to either
increase revenue or decrease benefits
(O’Leary and Kline 2019). Some states
allowed their existing tax systems
to trigger higher tax rates and a few
increased the share of payroll wages
that get taxed, but others were reluctant
to raise UI taxes quickly for fear of
choking off business recovery and labor
demand (Johnston 2021). Many states
prevented rate increases on employers,
preferring instead to repay debt by
taking smaller federal UI credits. Eight
states cut potential durations of regular
state benefits, and one of these also cut
weekly benefit amounts.2
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The Surge in Federal UI Funding
during the Pandemic
At the end of 2019, on the eve of
the pandemic, 31 states had reserves
that exceeded the 1.0 AHCM reserve
standard, but the average across all
states was still just 0.80, despite the
federal incentives and record low
unemployment (ET 394). These reserve
levels would not have been adequate to
finance benefits in the Great Recession,
let alone for the unprecedented claims
during the COVID-19 pandemic, and
the federal government needed to step
in. UI expenditures for 2020 and 2021
totaled $937 billion, of which the states
(through normal employer payroll tax
channels) paid only $185 billion (ETA
2112 and ET 394). The remaining 80
percent of spending was shouldered by
the federal government through special
UI programs.
The biggest share of federal
spending went to providing
supplements to weekly unemployment
benefits. The Federal Pandemic
Unemployment Compensation
(FPUC) program added $600 per week
to all UI benefit checks from early
April through July 2020 (under the
CARES Act), $300 per week from late
December 2020 to mid-March 2021
(under the Continued Assistance Act),
and $300 per week from mid-March
2021 to early September 2021 (under
the ARP Act).3 The FPUC payments
totaled $349 billion through year-end
2021. The Pandemic Unemployment
Assistance program provided $124
billion in benefits to persons not
eligible for regular UI, which covers
only employees with sufficient earnings
and workforce attachment. Another
federal program, Pandemic Emergency
Unemployment Compensation,
extended the duration of regular state
UI benefits, distributing an additional
$89 billion in federal funding. Under
the CARES and ARP Acts and, the
federal government also paid for
100 percent of benefits under the
permanent Extended Benefits program,

which extends UI benefit durations
when certain state-level unemployment
rate “triggers” are met. By statute,
the cost of those program benefits
is nominally shared 50-50 between
federal and state governments, but the
federal government paid $12 billion of

Benefits paid during and after
the Great Recession exhausted UI
reserves in 36 states, forcing them to
borrow from the U.S. Treasury.
the states’ share during the pandemic.
Additional, miscellaneous federal
contributions added another $174
billion in benefits, collectively bringing
the federal total to $752 billion.
Additional Federal Relief to States
and Use for UI Reserves
Besides these direct federal outlays
for UI benefits, other funds from
the CARES and ARP Acts may have
forestalled states’ need to reduce UI
benefits or increase taxes to avoid
exhausting their UI reserves or having
to borrow. Thirty-five states tapped
CARES and/or ARP in 2020 and 2021
to shore up their UI trust funds—by
a total of over $25 billion. Of these
35 states, California and Connecticut
still had negative net reserves at the
end of 2021, although California used
just $6.5 million from the CARES Act
while borrowing more than $19 billion
from the Treasury. Had it not been for
the infusion of cash, an additional 11
states would have had negative reserve
positions at the end of 2021 (Figure 1).
Prior to the pandemic, at yearend 2019, these 35 states had average
reserves of 1.14 (in AHCM terms);
by the end of 2021, their AHCMs
averaged 0.77—or just 0.20 without the
cash infusions (ET 394, NCSL, authors’
calculations adding wage data from UI
Quarterly Data Summary). Of the 17
states (and territories) that did not use
CARES or ARP funds to boost their

5

EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH • APRIL 2022

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

How Federal Pandemic Relief Helped Replenish State Unemployment Reserves

Figure 1 Average High-Cost Multiples among States Shoring Up Their UI Trusts with Federal
Funds, by Year and Impact of Funds Infusion
2.50
2.25

2019

2.00
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2021 less CARES/ARPA

1.75
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0.75
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ND
WA
MI
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TN
AZ
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DE
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NOTE: The average high-cost multiple (AHCM) is the ratio of UI reserves to the average of paid benefits over the
three highest payout years in the previous two decades. The chart includes the 35 states that infused CARES or
ARP funds into their UI trust funds and shows AHCMs by year, with and without the federal funds infusions.
SOURCE: ET Handbook 394, National Conference of State Legislatures, and authors’ calculations.

Figure 2 Average High-Cost Multiples among States Not Using Federal Funds to Supplement
Their UI Trusts, by Year
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NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for definition of AHCM. This chart includes the 17 states and territories that did not
use CARES or ARP funds to supplement their UI trust funds.
SOURCE: ET Handbook 394, National Conference of State Legislatures, and authors’ calculations.
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reserves, their 2019 year-end AHCMs
averaged 1.16, which fell to 0.29 by the
end of 2021 (ET 394, NCSL) (Figure 2).
During 2020 and 2021, despite
the availability of federal funds, 23
states and territories still borrowed
money for their UI programs from
the U.S. Treasury. Collectively, their
outstanding debt peaked at $55.2
billion in April 2021. Fifteen of these
states used CARES and/or ARP
funds to buttress reserves, and 10 still
had outstanding debt at the end of
2021. Just two states, California and
Connecticut, both used CARES/ARP
money and had outstanding debt at the
end of 2021 (NCSL, U.S. Department
of Treasury, fiscaldata.treasury.gov).
State Legislative Responses to the
Pandemic Surge in Benefit Payments
During the Great Recession, there
were no sources of federal funding
to replenish state UI reserves. In
contrast, during the pandemic in 2020
and 2021, nearly 100 laws modified
state UI systems but none reduced
benefits. Many of these laws instead
temporarily increased benefit receipt,
often through time-limited suspension
of both work search requirements
and experience rating of UI tax rates
(Levine 2021). Other laws mostly
improved financing and benefits.
Colorado and Connecticut raised their
taxable wage bases; Virginia and West
Virginia established work sharing
programs (allowing partial benefits
for workers whose hours are reduced);
and California, Georgia, Maine, New
York, and Oregon allowed workers
a higher earnings threshold before
losing UI eligibility. Furthermore,
while eight states issued municipal
bonds to finance UI debt after the
financial crisis, only Massachusetts
did so in the pandemic. Boosting UI
reserves through CARES and ARP
funds thus may have forestalled states
from restricting UI and may have even
accommodated expansions.
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Figure 3 Federal Share of Total UI Benefits in Recession Years and Shortly After

Notes
1. Technically, the AHCM is the number
of years of benefits available in state reserves
when paid out at the rate of the average of
the three highest annual payout rates in the
previous 20 years.
2. See O’Leary and Kline (2020) for a
discussion of states accepting reductions in
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)
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The federal government has
extended unemployment benefits
during every period of high
unemployment since 1958. The federal
share of all benefit payments was 7.9
percent that year and did not exceed 25
percent until 1983 (Figure 3). Between
2009 and 2013, UI benefit payments
totaled $742 billion, with federal
spending accounting for 64 percent of
the total. Despite this federal generosity
for UI, 36 states ended up borrowing
from the U.S. Treasury, as their own UI
reserves proved insufficient, and eight
states cut benefit durations to reduce
future obligations.
Despite these measures, the
majority of states were still unprepared
for the unprecedented spike in UI
claims in 2020 when the pandemic
hit and public health measures caused
work stoppages beyond the control of
employers. Federal financial support
for UI was impressive, accounting for
88.2 percent of all benefits paid in 2021.
For states reluctant to finance regular
UI benefits, federal actions in the
pandemic showed that help for workers
during unemployment crises is possible
even if state programs are modest.
However, the generous federal response
also may have discouraged states with
meager UI systems from improving
them. Without federal standards for
state benefit amounts and durations,
and only weak incentives for states
to adequately build up their reserves,
the nature of state UI programs as
independent, self-financing systems
for social insurance rests on tremulous
foundations.
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration: 1) UI Financial Transaction
Summary, ETA 2112; 2) ET Handbook 394; and 3) Monthly Program and Financial Data.

credit to repay outstanding debt, as well as
the list of states that reduced benefits.
3. In an effort to address labor shortages,
some states ended one or more of the
federal unemployment assistance programs
before the September 2021 expiration.
Coombs et al. (2021) found these early
withdrawals increased employment rates
slightly, but estimated gains in earnings
were small compared to the loss in benefits,
such that net aggregate income fell.
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